Since the electronic voting machines became popular, I've wondered why there's no paper trail. I mean, I get a reciept when I go to the ATM, right? How hard is it to do something like that with voting machines?
As you already guessed, I'm not a programmer or a mechanical engineer. I really have no idea how hard it is. But here's something interesting- Diebold, one of the largest manufacturers of electronic voting equipment, also makes ATMs. ATMs can handle a paycheck deposit, a fund transfer, a withdrawl- and give me a reciept for all of it. Why aren't machines, made by a company that already has this technology, then equipped with a printed verified voting trail? Plus, as you read in the article I linked to there (what, you didn't read it? I'll wait. ... Ok, thanks.) that the company wanted to keep its code private. I guess it makes some sense in a business-protection vein, but not when you have serious malfunctions and election results are in jeapardy. It would also make it awfully easy to hide any hacking that's been done, since the process can't be verified.
If only... if only we could verify that our vote was cast for whom we planned to cast it... if only there was a verified voting paper trail...
Head over to Rush Holt's Voter Confidence HR550 petition and sign it. Then, write your legislator and tell them you support it. Thanks.
(hat tip to DBK at Blanton's and Ashton's for the Diebold link.)
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